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THE RISE AND FALL AND RESURRECTION OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES
Paul H. Robinson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of the states adopted
comprehensive criminal codes based in large part upon the organization, if
not the specific provisions, of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code.1 Kentucky did this in 1974.2 The hallmarks of these modern
American codes—what made the Model Penal Code such an attractive
model and so well known around the world—were three things.
A. Comprehensiveness
First was the Code’s comprehensiveness. The goal of the Model Penal
Code drafters was to articulate all of the rules needed to adjudicate criminal
liability and to set the level of seriousness (the grade) of each offense. Such
comprehensiveness is attractive for several reasons: It maximizes fair notice
to citizens; it reduces discretion and disparity and increases uniformity in
application; and it reserves criminalization decisions to the legislature, the
most democratic branch, rather than delegating them de facto to the
judiciary, who must fill in any holes left by the Code.
The Model Penal Code has made the United States something of a
global leader in comprehensive codification. Around the world, one sees a
variety of different codification situations. The range of possibilities is
illustrated in the appended graphic.3
There remain few English-speaking countries that approximate pure
common law without statutes, a “1” on the continuum. Most British
Commonwealth countries have had modern codification reforms. At this
point, perhaps only Ireland remains without something like a modern code.
And Ireland was undertaking a criminal law codification project several
years ago, although it looks now as though it has failed. Ireland is probably
a “2” on this codification continuum.

* Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1
MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2
Kentucky Penal Code Act, 1974 Ky. Acts 831 (codified as amended in scattered sections of KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. L).
3
See infra Figure 1.
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That quarter of American states that did not codify their criminal law
during the 1960s and 1970s are typically a “3” on the continuum. They
have many criminal statutes covering most criminal conduct, but not
integrated into an organized code. And typically these states have no
codified “general part,” setting out the general principles of liability and
general defenses; no articulation of the general doctrines of imputation,
such as complicity and voluntary intoxication; and no scheme for the
consistent definition of culpability requirements and other terms used
throughout the code. Only states that modeled their codes after the Model
Penal Code rated a “5” on the continuum.
Many codes around the world are influenced by the German Penal
Code,4 which is a “4” on the continuum. That approach is comprehensive
in its coverage but skeletal in its articulation. That is, it has a full “special
part” and “general part” and does not allow the judicial creation of offenses,
but it does not purport to be a full statement of the liability and grading
rules that a judge might need to adjudicate a case. Instead, the German
approach is one that leaves unarticulated a variety of concepts that the
Germans think are better left to the sophistication and complexity
developed over a century or more in German criminal law scholarship.
Thus, for example, rather than attempting any articulation of what
constitutes causation, as the Model Penal Code does,5 the German approach
is to leave it to judges to consult the accumulated scholarship.6 This
approach makes the German Penal Code and others like it more of a table of
contents or an index, sending the reader to the relevant area of the scholarly
literature.
That approach may work well for the Germans, where many if not most
judges are also scholars, or even professors, but works less well for those
countries who have no such close relationship between the judiciary and
academia and no easy access to the enormous body of German academic
literature. To these countries, the American approach, which aspires to true
comprehensiveness in the articulation of all liability and grading rules, is
more attractive simply because it is more practical.
Interestingly, there do remain some criminal justice systems in the
world that are a “1” on the codification continuum: Islamic law is

4
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL.
I] 3322 (Ger.).
5
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03.
6
See Markus Dirk Dubber, Reforming American Penal Law, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49,
98 (1999) (“For instance, the concept of causation, recognized by all modern penal codes as a
constituent element of result offenses, goes undefined in . . . the German Penal Code, though not in the
Model Penal Code.”).
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traditionally uncodified.7 That may be changing, slowly,8 but it remains the
state of affairs even in many modern Muslim societies.
What is perhaps most striking about the state of codification around the
world is that countries over time move from left to right on the codification
continuum. Sometimes that movement takes a long time, but once they
move right, they essentially never move back to the left. That is, once a
society experiences the benefits of increased comprehensiveness in
codification—fair notice, reduced discretion, increased uniformity, and
legislative control—they have no interest in going back.
There is one exception of sorts to this general principle, a phenomena
that we see in almost all the modern American criminal codes enacted in the
1960s or 1970s. While the original codifications were a “5” on the
continuum, the processes of crime politics of the past forty or fifty years
have, as a practical matter, pushed these codes back from a “5” to provide
considerably less of the advantages that their original codifications did.
B. Orderliness
A second hallmark of modern criminal law codifications is the
orderliness and uniformity of their drafting structure. The offenses are
segregated into different chapters according to the interest at stake and,
within each chapter, are organized in order of seriousness. Most
importantly, there is a minimum of overlap between the offenses. All
conduct that deserves criminalization is included, ideally, under only one
provision. And the drafting style of provisions is clear and consistent
throughout the document, with a large number of defined terms, and a
single term having the same meaning throughout the code.
C. Principled
A final hallmark of modern American codes based on the Model Penal
Code is their principled nature. The Model Penal Code drafters really did
think through the principles that ought to underlie the criminal law rules.
While they may have ended up some distance from principled perfection,
they did at least try to reason out what the proper rule should be rather than

7
See generally Paul H. Robinson, Adnan Zulfiqar, Margaret Kammerud, Michael Orchowski,
Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Adam L. Pollock, Thomas M. O’Brien, John C. Lin, Tom Stenson, Negar Katirai,
J. John Lee & Marc Aaron Melzer, Codifying Shari’a: International Norms, Legality and the Freedom to
Invent New Forms, 2 J. COMP. L. 1 (2007).
8
See UNIV. OF PA. CRIMINAL LAW RESEARCH GRP., FINAL REPORT OF THE MALDIVIAN PENAL
LAW AND SENTENCING CODIFICATION PROJECT (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522222.
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simply codifying what had been done in the past or responding to the
political pressures of the moment.
II. THE VIRTUES OF MODERN AMERICAN CODIFICATION
Why should codes with these three characteristics—comprehensive,
orderly, and principled—be so attractive? Comprehensiveness, as noted
previously,9 is important because it provides fair notice, reduces discretion
and disparity, increases uniformity, and ensures that criminalization
authority resides in the most democratic branch, the legislature. To leave
issues unresolved in the code is a de facto delegation of criminalization
authority to the courts. It is obviously important for courts to have some
discretion in the adjudication of individual cases, but not regarding the rules
that govern liability and punishment. We must trust courts and juries to
determine the facts in an individual case and to apply those facts to the
governing law, but we must also insist that every defendant be judged by
exactly the same law, without regard to their good or bad luck in the judge
that they draw.
Orderly structure, and in particular the avoidance of unnecessarily
overlapping offenses, is important for a similar reason but involves different
players. The ideal code designates a specific offense and grade for any
given occurrence of a criminal harm or evil. When a criminal code has
many overlapping offenses, it creates discretion and power in prosecutors to
decide for themselves which of the different offenses will be charged and
punished, or whether they should all be. Again, this undermines the proper
allocation of the criminalization authority of the legislature and invites
unjustified disparity in similar cases depending upon a defendant’s good or
bad luck in the prosecutor that they draw. It also invites over-punishment
where overlapping offenses punish the same harm or evil.
Certainly an offender could engage in conduct that causes a variety of
criminal harms and evils. One criminal episode could include murder,
arson, and rape, and each of these should be punished as a separate offense.
But each of these three criminal harms ought to be punished as a single
offense, not each as related, multiple offenses at the discretion of the
prosecutor.
Finally, the principled nature of a code is also important—and not just
for philosophical reasons. We value rationality and internal consistency for
their own sake. They are part of our notion of justice. But there are also
important practical reasons for having a criminal code that is principled, and

9

See supra Part I.A.
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seen to be principled.
Within the last several decades, social science has demonstrated the
practical, crime-control value of building criminal law’s “moral credibility”
with the community it governs.10 If criminal law is seen as just, it will gain
deference and compliance rather than inspire resistance and subversion.
Perhaps more importantly, criminal law that has earned a reputation with
the community as a reliable moral authority gains the power to move people
to internalize the law’s norms. And that can be a more powerful—and a
less expensive—mechanism of gaining compliance than any threat of
criminal sanction. But irrationalities and internal inconsistencies in a
criminal code can quickly undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility,
and thereby undermine its power to gain compliance and deference through
social influence. There is practical, crime-control value, then, in a criminal
code that is internally consistent in its liability and grading rules and that is
seen as reliably doing justice and avoiding injustice.
III. THE FALL OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES
A. Degradation of Existing Codes
These important advantages of modern codification should be good
news for all of those states that adopted modern codes, right? It certainly
was good news in the 1960s and 1970s when those new codes were
enacted. The problem is that since that time, there has been a continuing
and accelerating flood of criminal law legislation that has tended to degrade
those codes and to undermine the virtues of their original codification.11
One might have thought that, after a new code was enacted, there might
be a quick spurt of legislation to fix the gaps or ambiguities exposed by
early practice, then a drop in legislation as all of the flaws were discovered
and fixed. In fact, just the reverse has occurred. There was a mere trickle
of criminal law legislation after enactment, but it typically has grown each
year since. And the new legislation is not tweaking one offense or another
to make it clear or to keep it current with the advances of human activity.
More often than not, existing statutes are ignored, and entirely new offenses
are being created that overlap and often conflict with existing offenses. In
many states, forty years of accumulated criminal law legislation,

10
See generally Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared
Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211
(2012).
11
See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal
Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635–44 (2005).

178

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:173

accelerating in rate each year, have left the original code unrecognizable—
lost under a mountain of often unnecessary, often contradictory, often
overlapping, and often unprincipled additions to the original,
comprehensive code. Further, many of the new offenses are added to
statutory titles outside of the criminal code.
Perhaps these new overlapping offenses are a good idea—belt and
suspenders, perhaps? For a variety of reasons, I think not. First, the
growing mountain of offenses, inside and outside of the criminal code,
make it increasingly unlikely that citizens really can sort out what the
criminal law commands of them. Second, as I noted previously,
overlapping offenses create unhealthy discretion in prosecutors to decide
what grade of an offense or how many offenses they will charge—
discretion that can produce seriously disparate results in similar cases
simply because of the different views of different prosecutors, or because of
the inconsistencies or prejudices of a single prosecutor.12 Perhaps even
more problematic is the enormous potential for injustice that arises from
such duplication. Subjecting offenders to punishment for multiple,
overlapping offenses can produce liability and punishment far beyond what
the offender’s conduct justifies.
Another problem comes from the conflicts between statutes and the
resulting ambiguities. What is a court to do when statutory terms are
defined differently in different places? Or if the same conduct is graded
differently in different statutes? And one may wonder: Why should we be
empowering courts to get back into the criminalization business—to make
legislative decisions forced upon them by such statutory conflicts and
ambiguities? How can a code be principled if different provisions provide
different definitions of the same criminal harm, or provide different offense
grades for the same conduct? In other words, the proliferation problem
undermines not only the criminal law’s orderliness, but also its principled
nature and its reservation of the criminalization power to the legislature.
These problems often occur because new legislation is not written to
integrate into the code, but rather to layer on top of it without regard to
what went before. And, of course, layering produces a vicious cycle. The
messier that the code gets, the less able or inclined legislators are to
integrate new legislation into the existing code. The more new legislation
that is layered on rather than integrated in, the more future legislation will
layer rather than integrate until dozens, if not hundreds, of overlapping
layers have been created. If you imagine the original Kentucky Penal Code
of 1974 as being the trim hull of a fast boat, the addition of hundreds of
12

See supra Part II.
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independent and overlapping patches can, over forty years, completely
obscure the original design, turning it into an irregular blob.
Another form of serious degradation has been the grading
inconsistencies created in the flood of new offenses that are layered on,
rather than integrated in, the codes. It is not uncommon for legislators
drafting a bill to do so in isolation, without consulting the existing grades of
related offenses already contained in the criminal code. The result is a
collection of gross grading irrationalities that grow worse every year. We
have documented and illustrated this phenomena in several jurisdictions.13
It is, unfortunately, simply the way of modern American criminal law
legislation.
A final form of degradation is found in statutes such as three-strikes
legislation—or, in Kentucky, persistent felony offender legislation—that
dramatically aggravate punishment for an offense based upon a defendant’s
prior criminal record.14 We know from empirical studies that people do see
some aggravation of blameworthiness and deserved punishment for repeat
offenders.15 After being warned and punished for the first, the second
offense is seen as a form of “nose thumbing,” as Andrew von Hirsch calls
it, that adds to the offender’s blameworthiness.16
But the studies also make clear that people see this repeat conduct as a
form of offense aggravation like other aggravations, perhaps increasing the
offense punishment by 10%, 20%, or even 30%. But many repeat offender
statutes make the offender’s prior criminal history more important than the
offense itself, often doubling or more the punishment imposed.17 These
dramatic increases seriously conflict with ordinary people’s intuitions of
justice and can only serve to bring the system into disrepute—to undermine
the system’s “moral credibility” with the community it governs.
In a similar vein is the enormous growth of mandatory minimum
sentences.
I understand the initial, understandable motivation for
mandatory minimums. There was a period in our history in which judges
were given vast discretion in sentencing, and many judges took that
opportunity to regularly produce gross failures of justice. But there is now
a well-developed solution to that problem—sentencing guidelines, in which
judges continue to have the flexibility to take into account the unique
circumstances of each individual case, but also have the guidance and

13

See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 11, at 641–44.
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
15
See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME (1996).
16
See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1437 (2001).
17
See id. at 1435 & n.25.
14
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incentive to try to match their judgments with those of other sentencing
judges.18
With the development of sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum
sentences are now archaic and destructive. They essentially guarantee a
stream of injustices, as some offenders in some cases really will have the
kind of important mitigations that demand a sentence in the lower end of
the range forbidden by the mandatory minimum. This guarantee of a string
of mandatory minimum injustices can only serve in the long run to
undermine the criminal justice system’s reputation for being just, for being
a reliable assessment of the punishment that each offender genuinely
deserves. And, as noted previously, that loss of moral credibility can have
serious consequences in the system’s loss of crime control effectiveness.19
B. Causes of Degradation
What drives this degradation of existing criminal law? The underlying
causes of degradation are found primarily in the inherent nature of the
legislative process.20 Many amendments and new offenses are enacted for
purely political purposes: Politicians propose a bill to show concern
regarding an issue about which their constituents are concerned. We cannot
be too critical here. They are simply trying to be responsive to their
community—normally something we see as a good thing, a basic feature of
democracy in action. They may be responding to an especially grim case in
the headlines or a case where an offender seemed to have received too little
punishment.
But in many of these cases, the problem has little to do with a flaw in
an existing criminal law rule. Not every problem can be fixed with a
criminal code amendment. People will continue to commit outrageous
crimes, judges will continue to make what are seen as sentencing errors, and
so on. Yet, legislators often feel a need to do something to show that they
are sensitive to their constituents’ concerns. And there are a few
“somethings” that they can do. Changing or adding to the criminal law is
one of those few things. But when crime legislation is simply a vehicle for
expressing concern, drafters have little reason to take account of existing
law. They aren’t really fixing a code problem, but rather are using their bill
as a vehicle to send an empathetic message of concern to their constituents.
We should not be surprised by overlaps and inconsistencies because there is
18
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2014); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 264–65 (2005).
19
See supra Part II.
20
See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 11, at 644–45.
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little motivation to integrate: Overlayering is always easier and faster and
often sends a clearer and more dramatic message.
Unfortunately, criminal law bills, even if useless and unnecessary,
commonly pass because legislators share a common reluctance to appear
“soft on crime.” When a new and unnecessary offense, say “library theft,”
is proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on whether legislators care
about public libraries, not on whether the proposed legislation will actually
do anything new to combat the problem of such theft, or on whether it will
instead have pernicious ramifications for the application of the criminal
code’s general theft provision. A legislator is likely to vote in favor of the
library-theft bill because there is a clear constituency—library users and
taxpayers—who would seem to share a concern about library theft, and no
constituency to complain about the new provision’s less obvious and more
diffuse drawbacks in creating inconsistencies, ambiguities, and overlaps.21
The larger point is that criminal law legislation provides an important
vehicle by which legislators can signal to their constituents that they are
concerned, and are doing something, about the crime concerns that their
constituents may have at that moment. With that, it matters little whether
the criminal law legislation simply duplicates, perhaps in inconsistent
terms, offenses already on the books.
Another sort of systemic problem might be called punishment inflation.
In order to emphasize how seriously the legislators take the new offense
created, the heat of the moment naturally pushes the grade of the offense
higher than it might otherwise be. A year or two later, when that heat has
died down, the grade may seem “out of whack” with other offenses. But
the exaggerated grade lives on.
Worse, the dynamic creates a vicious cycle. Having exaggerated the
grade of yesterday’s “crime du jour,” the legislator, in order to adequately
express outrage over today’s crime du jour, must exceed the new,
exaggerated baseline established by yesterday’s offense. The ultimate
effect is to create an upward spiral of grading and a hodgepodge of
inconsistent offense grades. There is no fixing this problem ad hoc.
Internal grading consistency throughout a code requires examining all of its
offense and sub-offense grades at one time, comparing each against the
grade of every other offense.
In talking about the problem of degradation of existing criminal codes, I
do not mean to single out Kentucky. We see this unhealthy dynamic in
every state that we have investigated.22 I do not know the details of the

21
22

See id.
See Paul H. Robinson, Thomas Gaeta, Matthew Majarian, Megan Schultz & Douglas M. Weck,
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criminal law legislation dynamics in Kentucky, but there seems little reason
to think that it is uniquely saved from the normal destructiveness of the
process. It may be better off than many other states,23 but there nonetheless
are reasons to be concerned. A Kentucky law professor recently estimated
that there are now 440 provisions in the criminal code and 1800 criminal
offenses outside of the code.24 These are dramatic increases over what
existed when the Kentucky Penal Code was enacted in 1974. In
comparison to Kentucky, however, many other states are much worse.25
What is to be done about the current mess in which we find ourselves?
Let me suggest some short-term solutions, but also some long-term
strategies.
IV. THE RESURRECTION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES
A. Short-Term Solutions
The short-term goal must be to reduce the mountain of overlapping
provisions to a single, integrated code, as existed with the original 1974
codification. This can only be done through a major overhaul, which will
take into account all of the existing accumulated statutes. It cannot be done
piecemeal or ad hoc. Let me suggest some basic principles in doing this
work.
First, there ought to be a strong preference for including all nontrivial
offenses in the criminal code itself, not scattered in titles outside of the
code.
Second, offenses ought to be defined as much as possible to identify
distinct, non-overlapping harms. Identify the basic harm or evil, and
capture it in one offense. If a criminal episode embodies several distinct
harms or evils, they can all be accounted for by convicting the offender for
a series of non-overlapping offenses.
Third, the legislature ought to provide as much grading distinction
within an offense as possible. It ought to identify those forms of the offense
The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 718–28 (2010).
23
See Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best)
American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 60–61 (2000) (ranking criminal codes using a
qualitative scoring system and finding Kentucky’s Penal Code ranks eleventh).
24
E-mail from William A. Hilyerd, Assoc. Professor of Legal Bibliography, Louis D. Brandeis Sch.
of Law, to Paul H. Robinson, Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., & Luke M.
Milligan, Assoc. Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis Sch. of Law (Aug. 28, 2014) (on file with author).
Forms of criminal activity that did not exist in 1974 require a trivial number of new offenses.
Traditional theft, for example, punishes taking “a thing of value,” even if that thing now includes
intangible computer data.
25
See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 11, at 635–37.
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that merit more punishment and those that merit less. This is a value
judgment that ought to be made by the legislature, not left to the judiciary
or prosecutors to decide ad hoc, which is what happens when the legislature
enacts statutes containing a wide range of offenses without identifying the
factors that distinguish more serious violations from less serious violations.
In other words, including sufficient offense grades is important both to
preserve the criminalization authority to the legislature and to ensure
uniformity in application of these grading judgments to different
defendants.
Fourth, the drafters ought to avoid “combination offenses” as much as
possible. Such offenses are particularly common in new legislation: taking
two individual offenses and combining them to create a brand-new third
offense, such as “carjacking.”26 Is anyone really worried that carjacking
was not a serious offense before the new carjacking statutes were enacted?
Theft, assault, and kidnapping statutes all exist in every jurisdiction in the
country. If the legislature wants to provide that some forms of these
offenses are more serious, it need only add a grade aggravator to that effect
in the existing offense; there is no need to create a special, new combination
offense.
One of the problems with combination offenses is that they reduce
grading nuance. Let me use robbery, a long-existing combination offense,
to illustrate the problem. Robbery is the combination of theft and assault or
threat.27 As the graphic illustrates,28 a jurisdiction might have four grades
of each of these two offenses. (In fact, a jurisdiction is likely to have many
more grades than this.) When the two offenses are combined into robbery,
however, a similar four-category grading scheme for robbery reduces the
grading nuance by three-quarters. Of the sixteen possible combinations of
grades provided by the four grades of theft and the four grades of assault,
the four robbery grades must ignore twelve of the sixteen combinations. (In
fact, many if not most jurisdictions have fewer grades of robbery than
four.29) When grading robbery, which grading distinctions for theft and for
assault are to be ignored? And what justification can be used for ignoring
them? If the drafters have already determined that they are important
enough to alter the grade of the theft offense or the assault offense, why not
also the robbery offense?

26
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012) (federal anti-carjacking statute); CAL. PENAL CODE § 215
(West 2014) (state anti-carjacking statute).
27
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
28
See infra Figure 2.
29
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.020–.030 (West 2006) (defining robbery in the first- and
second-degrees).
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For these reasons and others, the Model Penal Code drafters thought
seriously about dropping such combination offenses as robbery and
burglary, but finally decided to keep them simply because they had such a
long history, and states would expect to see them in the Code.30 That may
be an adequate justification for keeping these two combination offenses, but
the damage to grading nuance strongly suggests that the modern popularity
of inventing new combination offenses ought to be abandoned.
Fifth, there ought to be a strong preference for updating an existing
offense rather than creating a new offense. Thus, the general theft offense
ought to be relied upon to punish all forms of unlawful taking of the
property of another, be it library thefts or the theft of intangible data. To
the extent that some special definitions are required to ensure the adequate
coverage of the offense, then they can and should be added. But there is
little to be gained, and much to be lost, by creating new offenses of library
theft or data theft. We ought to avoid creating a host of special theft
offenses scattered throughout the criminal code, or even outside the code,
and ought to aim instead for consolidating offenses of a similar or related
nature.
Sixth, as noted previously, the code ought to provide definitions of
terms whenever it would be useful.31 Most importantly, the same term
ought to have the same definition throughout the code. If some different
meaning is needed in a special context, then a different term ought to be
used to carry that different meaning.
Finally, after defining offenses and determining the grades for each
offense and sub-offense, the drafters ought to undertake a general study of
the internal coherence of the grades that they have assigned.32 Here is the
procedure I recommend. After deciding how many offense-grading
categories to recognize, identify for each category at least two specific
offense examples to serve as “milestones”—a set of markers against which
every other offense or sub-offense in the code can be compared and tested.
For each offense with a separate grade, the drafters should ask whether the
conduct described in that offense matches the seriousness of the milestone

30
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1 cmt. 2, 222.1 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980) (discussing rationale for retaining burglary and robbery, respectively, as combination offenses).
31
See supra Part I.B.
32
For examples of how these studies could be conducted, see generally Robinson, Gaeta, Majarian,
Schultz & Weck, supra note 22; Paul H. Robinson, Rebecca Levenson, Nicholas Feltham, Andrew
Sperl, Kristen-Elise Brooks, Agatha Koprowski, Jessica Peake, Benjamin Probber & Brian Trainor,
Report on Offense Grading in New Jersey (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 1103, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737825; Paul H. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading
in Pennsylvania (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 10-01, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527149.
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offense, or whether perhaps it better matches the seriousness of the nexthigher milestone offense or the next-lower milestone offense. At the end of
the process, the drafters can produce a list of all offenses and sub-offenses
in each grading category, and they can then perform a quality control check
by working through all of the offenses in that category to confirm that they
all do indeed reflect a comparable level of seriousness.
This grading exercise was performed in relation to the Kentucky Penal
Code Revision Project in 2003. The Final Report of the Kentucky Penal
Code Revision Project contains a table for each offense grade, including a
list of all of the sub-offenses from the draft code with that grading
classification.33 The process of producing these summary grading tables
was one that revealed many grading inconsistencies that had previously
gone unnoticed during the drafting process.
B. The Political Feasibility of Recodification
I have made the case here for a general recodification of existing
criminal statutes. Such a project is clearly feasible from a drafting point of
view. It is essentially what was done by the Kentucky Penal Code Revision
Project in 2003, although the work now will require incorporating the many
new and overlapping provisions that have accumulated in the decade since.
One may wonder, however, whether such a project is politically
feasible. The Kentucky Attorney General’s Office opposed the Revision
Project.34 And that is not an irrational position for prosecutors, at least
those with a short-term perspective. They benefit from the current disorder
of the Kentucky Penal Code, especially the variety of overlapping offenses
that have arisen from the hundreds of criminal law amendments layered
over the original. So perhaps I should speak most directly to prosecutors’
needs and concerns, and explain why these kinds of reforms ought to be
attractive to them. Yes, the current mess does give them many overlapping
offenses and, consequently, much flexibility and discretion in how and what
to charge in any given situation. They have the ability to take an offense
and treat it as something relatively minor or to transform it into a whole
string of serious offenses. The appeal to prosecutors is understandable.
But prosecutors should be aware that there is also a cost to it, albeit a
hidden cost. Not only does it create a messy system aesthetically, but it
also has several unattractive practical consequences. It gives the system a

33
KY. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE REVISION
PROJECT 135–52 (2003).
34
See 2 id. at 333.

186

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:173

reputation as being more unpredictable, more discretionary, and therefore
less uniform and more disparate in its treatment of defendants. But why
should prosecutors care about the system’s reputation for reliability and
consistency in doing justice and avoiding injustice? Let me suggest why
they should care.
As I hinted at earlier, social scientists have shown us—with studies that
have arisen only since the original Kentucky Penal Code—that the greatest
power of the criminal justice system may lie not in its threat of official
sanction, but rather in the social influence of its moral authority.35 A
criminal justice system that has more credibility with the community it
governs is more likely to prompt acquiescence in support rather than
resistance and subversion. This reputational effect can influence players
throughout the system. Do witnesses report crimes? Do they cooperate
with investigators? Do jurors follow their instructions? The system’s
reputation even influences the professional players within it. Do police,
prosecutors, and judges follow the spirit and text of legislative rules, or do
they feel free to make up their own rules? A system that has earned a
reputation for great moral credibility will gain deference. A system that has
not will inspire resistance and subversion.
Perhaps even more important than this is the influence that the system’s
reputation has in gaining compliance from citizens. A system that has
earned a reputation as a reliable moral authority is more likely to gain
deference from people in those important cases in which the moral status of
the law’s prohibition is ambiguous. Is downloading music without a license
really condemnable? Is insider trading? Is coercing consent to intercourse
on a date really condemnable? Criminal law that has earned a reputation as
a moral authority will not only gain compliance in these gray area cases,
but, most importantly, is more likely to induce all citizens to internalize the
norms that the criminal law announces. In contrast, a criminal law seen as
regularly doing injustice loses its moral credibility with the community and
loses its power to gain deference and compliance, as well as the power to
induce the internalization of its norms.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that prosecutors are not
persuaded by this research and these arguments. Let me suggest to
legislators that they ought to press ahead nonetheless, even in the face of
prosecutorial opposition. Not only would they have on their side all of the
arguments described above about the practical, crime-control value of a
35
See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT (2013);
Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1940 (2010); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453
(1997).
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system with a reputation for consistency and uniformity in doing justice and
avoiding injustice, but they also would have a good political reason to press
for these reforms.
Just as the enactment of a comprehensive criminal code shifted
criminalization authority away from the judiciary and vested it in the more
democratic legislative branch, so too does the process of systematic
degradation of a comprehensive criminal code shift criminalization
power—shifting it away from the legislature and to the prosecutor. That is
not only bad because of its long-term effect of undermining the moral
authority of the criminal justice system by producing inconsistent and
unpredictable results, but also is bad because it takes those criminalization
decisions away from where they belong—from the people of Kentucky
through their elected representatives in the legislature. A criminal code that
gives prosecutors so many different options on how to treat any given
criminal offense is a criminal code by which the legislature forsakes its
important role in reflecting the community’s shared views about justice.
The only way that a criminal justice system can be predictable and
consistent in its criminal liability and punishment is to have a criminal code
that on its face controls basic liability and punishment decisions. Every
defendant ought to be treated the same, no matter who they have as a
prosecutor. Every victim’s chance at true justice ought to be the same, no
matter who prosecutes their case. That requires a comprehensive and
tightly-defined system of offenses, based upon a coherent grading structure,
applicable the same in all cases, and only the General Assembly can
provide that.
Even if all of this is true, is it realistic to think that legislators—even
knowing that it is the right thing to do—can rise above their political fears
to oppose what prosecutors want? Even if the alternative is to essentially
give up their legislative power to the prosecutors, is it realistic that
legislators would oppose prosecutors on criminal law matters? After all,
the reality is that every legislator’s primary concern, if they are to continue
to do their good works, must be to get reelected. They can do no good
works if they lose the next election. Is not the political risk that comes from
opposing prosecutors just too high to expect them to take it? Being accused
of being “soft on crime” can be a powerful election cudgel for their
opponent.
But here is where structural changes to the system can make a
difference. Let me then talk about long-term strategies to effective criminal
law reform.
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C. Long-Term Strategies
Stepping back for a moment from the political feasibility question, let
us assume for the sake of argument that a new criminal code was, in fact,
enacted following the drafting principles I have previously detailed.36 This
would be a good thing. But for how long would it last? Why would the
same processes and influences that caused the degradation of the 1974
Kentucky Penal Code over the past four decades not still be at work, ready
to begin degrading the new code as soon as it was enacted? If the
degradation problem is to be solved long-term, it requires some strategies
that will undermine the degradation process. Is that possible?
I believe that it is possible, but let me be frank in conceding that it has
not yet been done. We are at a point where most states are very much in
need of recodification and of a long-term strategy for avoiding future
degradation, but no state has yet done it. Perhaps Kentucky can provide the
model.
Let me suggest a variety of mechanisms that might help. All of them
are designed toward the same goal: to provide what might be called
“amendment discipline” in future criminal law legislation.
First, future amendments should revise the existing criminal code
provisions; they should integrate into them rather than overlaying them. Of
course, this requires some continuing body with influence over legislative
proposals that can build and retain expertise on the structure and drafting
style of the criminal code. This could be a body outside of the legislature,
such as the Criminal Justice Council, or some other, newly-created body.
But it would have to be given somehow (or perhaps just take) the role of
critiquing criminal law reform proposals in light of the existing code
provisions. This critique could be very much helped by requiring all
proposed legislation concerning criminal law to be accompanied by an
“impact statement” (or something of that nature) that would describe all of
the existing law on the subject and explain why that existing law is
inadequate or flawed and why the proposed legislation would fix the
problem.
Another aspect of “amendment discipline” is to ensure that only
essential changes are made to existing law—that the proposed revision is
truly necessary to solve a real problem and can do so. Of course, when
criminal law legislation is used simply as a vehicle to send a message of
concern to constituents, it will be difficult (if not impossible) for proponents
of legislation to make the case that the legislation is essential. The point is

36

See supra Part IV.A.
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that amending the criminal code ought to be the last resort—not the first. If
the problem can be solved with a memorandum to judges or prosecutors
urging them to interpret or apply existing law differently, then that ought to
be preferred.
This suggests another structural change in the process that might be
useful. As mentioned before, we need to be sympathetic to the situation in
which legislators find themselves.37 They will always want to find some
way to communicate their empathetic concern to their constituents. To
avoid having that message vehicle be unnecessary criminal code
amendments, perhaps the process should create an alternative vehicle. A
good candidate could be to provide an official commentary to the new penal
code, which would have a standing similar to legislative history in the
interpretation of the code’s provisions.38 Thus, an official commentary
would be promulgated to accompany the recodification and, most
importantly, would be a living document to be kept up-to-date by legislative
revision as needed. Thus, when a case in the news has constituents worked
up, it may be enough of a signal of concern from legislators to pass
legislation to modify the official commentary.
If librarians are anxious to have some special public confirmation that
taking library books is theft, a line could be added to the official
commentary to the theft offense confirming that taking public library books
is theft. That legislative action may be all that is needed to keep the
librarians happy. It may well be that the added sentence is, as a practical
matter, unnecessary, but its real value is in providing an outlet for the
expression of legislative concern without creating a troublesome new,
overlapping theft offense.
Another aspect of structural reform addresses the problem of irrational
grading. I suggested previously that the recodification project include a
process of comparing all offenses and sub-offenses to “milestone” examples
of each grading category.39 I would recommend that proponents of new
offenses or new grades be obliged to undertake that same task. Perhaps as
part of the required “impact statement,” a bill’s sponsors would be required
to compare their new offense or new offense grading provision to the
milestone examples for the offense grade that they are proposing, and to

37

See supra Part III.B.
Cf. Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. Capital Cmty. Econ./Indus. Dev. Corp., 434 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Ky.
2014) (“Where a statute is ambiguous, we resort to legislative history, canons of statutory construction
and, in the case of uniform statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code, interpretations by other
courts. In this case, we also have the benefit of Official Comments to the UCC provisions, Comments
which the legislature has indicated ‘represent the express legislative intent of the General Assembly and
shall be used as a guide for interpretation.’” (citations omitted)).
39
See supra Part IV.A.
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compare it to the other sub-offenses with that same grade in the current
code.
Such “impact reports” could spark a healthy debate about whether the
proposed criminal law revision is, in fact, appropriate and necessary. And
where some body with criminal law expertise exists outside of the
legislature—be it the Criminal Justice Council, or some other official or
unofficial body—the resulting public debate could provide just the political
cover that legislators need to vote against an unnecessary new offense or an
inappropriate grading increase. Of course, this can only work if the
independent body has earned credibility with the public—has shown itself
to be as opposed to inappropriate failures of justice as it is opposed to
injustice. But once it has earned that credibility, the thoughtful legislator
can do the right thing and vote against the unnecessary or inappropriate
criminal law legislation without fear of being labeled “soft on crime” at the
next election.
There are many crime problems that will create concern among voters,
but the truth is that many if not most of them cannot be solved with
amendments to the criminal code. Changing police procedures, increasing
police funding, promoting job training and education, developing better
drug and alcohol programs, and a host of other reforms may be the real
solution to the problem. But these are often outside of the reach of
legislators. Amending the criminal code is a lever of power within easy
reach, and if we are to avoid degradation of the criminal code in the future,
we must develop a system in which legislators can realistically be expected
to resist the easy response of pulling that particular lever of power.
I have suggested several structural changes here. Frankly, however, it
is only the legislators themselves who are in a position to know what kind
of changes are feasible, and who can actually succeed in bringing about
“amendment discipline” in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as most states codified their criminal laws in the 1960s and 1970s,
the next several decades will see those same states struggling with what to
do with their increasingly dysfunctional and chaotic criminal codes. Some
of those codes have grown to six, seven, or eight times the size of their
original codification, yet with very little actual additional criminalization.
That mountain of overlapping legal provisions does little but produce
inconsistency and uncertainty, and the problem grows worse every year as
the avalanche of criminal law legislation not only continues in most states,
but accelerates.
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FIGURE 1. THE RANGE OF APPROACHES
Codification Continuum
1
Pure Common
Law

2
Scattered
Statutes

3
Law Primarily
Statutory, But
Not Integrated
Into Full Code

4
Full Special
Part and
General Part,
But Skeletal

5
Self-Contained,
Comprehensive
Full Code

FIGURE 2. THE PROBLEM OF COMBINATION OFFENSES
Offense of Theft
Sample Element 1
Sample Element 2
Sample Element 3
Sample Element 4

Offense of Threat or Assault

Amount is greater than or equal to
$5,000
Amount is greater than or equal to
$500, but less than $5,000
Amount is greater than or equal to
$50, but less than $500
Amount is less than $50

Act causes serious bodily injury
Act causes bodily injury
Act of physical menacing causes
fear of serious bodily injury
Threat of act causes fear of
serious bodily injury

Combination Offense of Robbery
Hypothetical Grade 1
Hypothetical Grade 2
Hypothetical Grade 3
Hypothetical Grade 4

Usually, robbery has three or four grades.
The drafters select certain combinations of
the theft and threat or assault factors to
create the robbery grades.
Theft and Assault as Independent Offenses

Using the distinctions identified as significant, the code would recognize sixteen varieties of
“robbery” (i.e., four theft categories x four threat or assault categories), depending on the
combination of theft and threat or assault factors. The combination offense must ignore
twelve of the sixteen combinations.

